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Berikut adalah tuntutan Filipina: 
1. China’s maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, like those of the 
Philippines, may not extend beyond those expressly permitted by the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; 
2. China’s claims to sovereign rights jurisdiction, and to  “historic rights”, 
with respect to the maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed by 
the so-called “nine-dash line” are contrary to  the  Convention  and  
without  lawful  effect  to  the  extent  that  they  exceed  the  geographic  
and substantive limits of China’s maritime entitlements expressly 
permitted by UNCLOS; 
3. Scarborough Shoal generates no entitlement to an exclusive economic 
zone or continental shelf; 
4. Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, and Subi Reef are low-tide 
elevations that do not generate entitlement to a territorial sea, exclusive 
economic zone or continental shelf, and are not features that are capable 
of appropriation by occupation or otherwise; 
5. Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are part of the exclusive 
economic zone and continental shelf of the Philippines; 
6. Gaven Reef and McKennan Reef  (including Hughes Reef) are low-tide 
elevations that do not generate entitlement to a territorial sea,  exclusive  
economic  zone  or  continental  shelf,  but  their low-water line may be 
used to determine the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial 
sea of Namyit and Sin Cowe, respectively, is measured; 
7. Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef and Fiery Cross Reef generate no 
entitlement to an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf; 
8. China has unlawfully interfered with the enjoyment and exercise of the 
sovereign rights of the Philippines with respect to the living and non-
living resources of its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf; 
9. China has unlawfully failed to prevent its nationals and vessels from 
exploiting the living resources in the exclusive economic zone of the 
Philippines; 
10. China has unlawfully prevented Philippine fishermen from pursuing their 




11. China has violated its obligations under the Convention to protect and 
preserve the marine environment at Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas 
Shoal, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef, Johnson Reef, 
Hughes Reef and Subi Reef; 
12. China’s occupation of and construction activities on Mischief Reef 
(a) Violate the provisions of the Convention concerning artificial islands, 
installations and structures; 
(b) Violate China’s duties to protect and preserve the marine environment 
under the Convention; and 
(c) Constitute unlawful acts of attempted appropriation in violation of the 
Convention; 
13. China has breached its obligations under the Convention by operating its 
law enforcement vessels in a dangerous manner, causing serious risk of 
collision to Philippine vessels navigating in the vicinity of Scarborough 
Shoal; 
14. Since the commencement of this arbitration in January 2013, China has 
unlawfully aggravated and extended the dispute by, among other things: 
(a) interfering  with  the  Philippines’  rights  of  navigation  in  the  
waters  at,  and  adjacent  to, Second Thomas Shoal; 
(b) preventing the rotation and resupply of Philippine personnel stationed 
at Second Thomas Shoal; 
(c) endangering the health and well-being of Philippine personnel 
stationed at Second Thomas Shoal; and 
(d) conducting dredging, artificial island-building and construction 
activities at Mischief Reef,  
(e) Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef, Johnson Reef, Hughes 
Reef and Subi Reef; and 
15. China shall respect the rights and freedoms of the Philippines under the 
Convention, shall comply with its duties under the Convention, including 
those relevant to the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment in the South China Sea, and shall exercise its rights and 
freedoms in the South China Sea with due regard to those of the 
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I. Introduction 
1. On 22 January 2013, the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the 
Philippines presented a note verbale to the Embassy of the People's Republic of 
China in the Philippines, stating that the Philippines submitted a Notification and 
Statement of Claim in order to initiate compulsory arbitration proceedings under 
Article 287 and Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
("Convention") with respect to the dispute with China over "maritime jurisdiction" in 
the South China Sea. On 19 February 2013, the Chinese Government rejected and 
returned the Philippines' note verbale together with the attached Notification and 
Statement of Claim. The Chinese Government has subsequently reiterated that it will 
neither accept nor participate in the arbitration thus initiated by the Philippines. 
 
2. This Position Paper is intended to demonstrate that the arbitral tribunal 
established at the request of the Philippines for the present arbitration ("Arbitral 
Tribunal") does not have jurisdiction over this case. It does not express any position 
on the substantive issues related to the subject-matter of the arbitration initiated by 
the Philippines. No acceptance by China is signified in this Position Paper of the 
views or claims advanced by the Philippines, whether or not they are referred to 
herein. Nor shall this Position Paper be regarded as China's acceptance of or 
participation in this arbitration. 
3. This Position Paper will elaborate on the following positions: 
● The essence of the subject-matter of the arbitration is the territorial sovereignty 
over several maritime features in the South China Sea, which is beyond the scope of 
the Convention and does not concern the interpretation or application of the 
Convention;  
● China and the Philippines have agreed, through bilateral instruments and the 
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, to settle their relevant 
disputes through negotiations. By unilaterally initiating the present arbitration, the 
Philippines has breached its obligation under international law;  
● Even assuming, arguendo, that the subject-matter of the arbitration were 
concerned with the interpretation or application of the Convention, that subject-
matter would constitute an integral part of maritime delimitation between the two 
countries, thus falling within the scope of the declaration filed by China in 2006 in 
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accordance with the Convention, which excludes, inter alia, disputes concerning 
maritime delimitation from compulsory arbitration and other compulsory dispute 
settlement procedures; 
● Consequently, the Arbitral Tribunal manifestly has no jurisdiction over the present 
arbitration. Based on the foregoing positions and by virtue of the freedom of every 
State to choose the means of dispute settlement, China's rejection of and non-
participation in the present arbitration stand on solid ground in international law. 
 
II. The essence of the subject-matter of the arbitration is the territorial sovereignty 
over several maritime features in the South China Sea, which does not concern the 
interpretation or application of the Convention 
4. China has indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands (the Dongsha 
Islands, the Xisha Islands, the Zhongsha Islands and the Nansha Islands) and the 
adjacent waters. Chinese activities in the South China Sea date back to over 2,000 
years ago. China was the first country to discover, name, explore and exploit the 
resources of the South China Sea Islands and the first to continuously exercise 
sovereign powers over them. From the 1930s to 1940s, Japan illegally seized some 
parts of the South China Sea Islands during its war of aggression against China. At 
the end of the Second World War, the Chinese Government resumed exercise of 
sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands. Military personnel and government 
officials were sent via naval vessels to hold resumption of authority ceremonies. 
Commemorative stone markers were erected, garrisons stationed, and geographical 
surveys conducted. In 1947, China renamed the maritime features of the South China 
Sea Islands and, in 1948, published an official map which displayed a dotted line in 
the South China Sea. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China on 1 
October 1949, the Chinese Government has been consistently and actively 
maintaining its sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands. Both the Declaration of 
the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea of 1958 and 
the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone of 1992 expressly provide that the territory of the People's Republic of China 
includes, among others, the Dongsha Islands, the Xisha Islands, the Zhongsha 
Islands and the Nansha Islands. All those acts affirm China's territorial sovereignty 
and relevant maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea. 
 
5. Prior to the 1970s, Philippine law had set clear limits for the territory of the 
Philippines, which did not involve any of China's maritime features in the South 
China Sea. Article 1 of the 1935 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 
entitled "The National Territory", provided that "The Philippines comprises all the 
territory ceded to the United States by the Treaty of Paris concluded between the 
United States and Spain on the tenth day of December, eighteen hundred and ninety-
eight, the limits which are set forth in Article III of said treaty, together with all the 
islands embraced in the treaty concluded at Washington between the United States 
and Spain on the seventh day of November, nineteen hundred, and the treaty 
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concluded between the United States and Great Britain on the second day of January, 
nineteen hundred and thirty, and all territory over which the present Government of 
the Philippine Islands exercises jurisdiction." Under this provision, the territory of 
the Philippines was confined to the Philippine Islands, having nothing to do with any 
of China's maritime features in the South China Sea. Philippine Republic Act No. 
3046, entitled "An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the 
Philippines", which was promulgated in 1961, reaffirmed the territorial scope of the 
country as laid down in the 1935 Constitution. 
 
6. Since the 1970s, the Philippines has illegally occupied a number of maritime 
features of China's Nansha Islands, including Mahuan Dao, Feixin Dao, Zhongye 
Dao, Nanyao Dao, Beizi Dao, Xiyue Dao, Shuanghuang Shazhou and Siling Jiao. 
Furthermore, it unlawfully designated a so-called "Kalayaan Island Group" to 
encompass some of the maritime features of China's Nansha Islands and claimed 
sovereignty over them, together with adjacent but vast maritime areas. Subsequently, 
it laid unlawful claim to sovereignty over Huangyan Dao of China's Zhongsha 
Islands. In addition, the Philippines has also illegally explored and exploited the 
resources on those maritime features and in the adjacent maritime areas. 
 
7. The Philippines' activities mentioned above have violated the Charter of the United 
Nations and international law, and seriously encroached upon China's territorial 
sovereignty and maritime rights and interests. They are null and void in law. The 
Chinese Government has always been firmly opposed to these actions of the 
Philippines, and consistently and continuously made solemn representations and 
protests to the Philippines. 
 
8. The Philippines has summarized its claims for arbitration in three categories: 
First, China's assertion of the "historic rights" to the waters, sea-bed and subsoil 
within the "nine-dash line" (i.e., China's dotted line in the South China Sea) beyond 
the limits of its entitlements under the Convention is inconsistent with the Convention.  
Second, China's claim to entitlements of 200 nautical miles and more, based on 
certain rocks, low-tide elevations and submerged features in the South China Sea, is 
inconsistent with the Convention.  
Third, China's assertion and exercise of rights in the South China Sea have 
unlawfully interfered with the sovereign rights, jurisdiction and rights and freedom of 
navigation that the Philippines enjoys and exercises under the Convention. 
 
9. The subject-matter of the Philippines' claims is in essence one of territorial 
sovereignty over several maritime features in the South China Sea, which is beyond 
the scope of the Convention and does not concern the interpretation or application of 
the Convention. Consequently, the Arbitral Tribunal has no jurisdiction over the 




10. With regard to the first category of claims presented by the Philippines for 
arbitration, it is obvious that the core of those claims is that China's maritime claims 
in the South China Sea have exceeded the extent allowed under the Convention. 
However, whatever logic is to be followed, only after the extent of China's territorial 
sovereignty in the South China Sea is determined can a decision be made on whether 
China's maritime claims in the South China Sea have exceeded the extent allowed 
under the Convention. 
 
11. It is a general principle of international law that sovereignty over land territory is 
the basis for the determination of maritime rights. As the International Court of 
Justice ("ICJ") stated, "maritime rights derive from the coastal State's sovereignty 
over the land, a principle which can be summarized as 'the land dominates the sea'" 
(Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar 
v. Bahrain), Merits, Judgment of 16 March 2001, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 97, para. 
185; cf. also North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; 
Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment of 20 February 1969, I.C.J. 
Reports 1969, p. 51, para. 96; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), 
Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment of 19 December 1978, I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 36, 
para. 86). And, "[i]t is thus the terrestrial territorial situation that must be taken as 
starting point for the determination of the maritime rights of a coastal State" (Qatar 
v. Bahrain, I.C.J. Reports 2001, para. 185; Territorial and Maritime Dispute between 
Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment 
of 8 October 2007, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 696, para. 113). Recently the ICJ again 
emphasized that "[t]he title of a State to the continental shelf and to the exclusive 
economic zone is based on the principle that the land dominates the sea", and that 
"the land is the legal source of the power which a State may exercise over territorial 
extensions to seaward" (Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), 
Judgment of 19 November 2012, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 51, para. 140). 
 
12. The preamble of the Convention proclaims "the desirability of establishing 
through this Convention, with due regard for the sovereignty of all States, a legal 
order for the seas and oceans". It is apparent that "due regard for the sovereignty of 
all States" is the prerequisite for the application of the Convention to determine 
maritime rights of the States Parties. 
 
13. As far as the present arbitration is concerned, without first having determined 
China's territorial sovereignty over the maritime features in the South China Sea, the 
Arbitral Tribunal will not be in a position to determine the extent to which China may 
claim maritime rights in the South China Sea pursuant to the Convention, not to 
mention whether China's claims exceed the extent allowed under the Convention. But 




14. The Philippines is well aware that a tribunal established under Article 287 and 
Annex VII of the Convention has no jurisdiction over territorial sovereignty disputes. 
In an attempt to circumvent this jurisdictional hurdle and fabricate a basis for 
institution of arbitral proceedings, the Philippines has cunningly packaged its case in 
the present form. It has repeatedly professed that it does not seek from the Arbitral 
Tribunal a determination of territorial sovereignty over certain maritime features 
claimed by both countries, but rather a ruling on the compatibility of China's 
maritime claims with the provisions of the Convention, so that its claims for 
arbitration would appear to be concerned with the interpretation or application of 
the Convention, not with the sovereignty over those maritime features. This contrived 
packaging, however, fails to conceal the very essence of the subject-matter of the 
arbitration, namely, the territorial sovereignty over certain maritime features in the 
South China Sea. 
 
15. With regard to the second category of claims by the Philippines, China believes 
that the nature and maritime entitlements of certain maritime features in the South 
China Sea cannot be considered in isolation from the issue of sovereignty. 
 
16. In the first place, without determining the sovereignty over a maritime feature, it 
is impossible to decide whether maritime claims based on that feature are consistent 
with the Convention. 
 
17. The holder of the entitlements to an exclusive economic zone ("EEZ") and a 
continental shelf under the Convention is the coastal State with sovereignty over 
relevant land territory. When not subject to State sovereignty, a maritime feature per 
se possesses no maritime rights or entitlements whatsoever. In other words, only the 
State having sovereignty over a maritime feature is entitled under the Convention to 
claim any maritime rights based on that feature. Only after a State's sovereignty over 
a maritime feature has been determined and the State has made maritime claims in 
respect thereof, could there arise a dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application of the Convention, if another State questions the compatibility of those 
claims with the Convention or makes overlapping claims. If the sovereignty over a 
maritime feature is undecided, there cannot be a concrete and real dispute for 
arbitration as to whether or not the maritime claims of a State based on such a 
feature are compatible with the Convention. 
18. In the present case, the Philippines denies China's sovereignty over the maritime 
features in question, with a view to completely disqualifying China from making any 
maritime claims in respect of those features. In light of this, the Philippines is putting 
the cart before the horse by requesting the Arbitral Tribunal to determine, even 
before the matter of sovereignty is dealt with, the issue of compatibility of China's 
maritime claims with the Convention. In relevant cases, no international judicial or 
arbitral body has ever applied the Convention to determine the maritime rights 




19. Secondly, in respect of the Nansha Islands, the Philippines selects only a few 
features and requests the Arbitral Tribunal to decide on their maritime entitlements. 
This is in essence an attempt at denying China's sovereignty over the Nansha Islands 
as a whole. 
 
20. The Nansha Islands comprises many maritime features. China has always 
enjoyed sovereignty over the Nansha Islands in its entirety, not just over some 
features thereof. In 1935, the Commission of the Chinese Government for the Review 
of Maps of Land and Waters published the Map of Islands in the South China Sea. In 
1948, the Chinese Government published the Map of the Location of the South China 
Sea Islands. Both maps placed under China's sovereignty what are now known as the 
Nansha Islands as well as the Dongsha Islands, the Xisha Islands and the Zhongsha 
Islands. The Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the 
Territorial Sea of 1958 declared that the territory of the People's Republic of China 
includes, inter alia, the Nansha Islands. In 1983, the National Toponymy Commission 
of China published standard names for some of the South China Sea Islands, 
including those of the Nansha Islands. The Law of the People's Republic of China on 
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 1992 again expressly provides that 
the Nansha Islands constitutes a part of the land territory of the People's Republic of 
China. 
 
21. In Note Verbale No. CML/8/2011 of 14 April 2011 addressed to Secretary-
General of the United Nations, the Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations 
stated that "under the relevant provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, as well as the Law of the People's Republic of China on the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1992) and the Law on the Exclusive 
Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the People's Republic of China (1998), 
China's Nansha Islands is fully entitled to Territorial Sea, Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) and Continental Shelf." It is plain that, in order to determine China's maritime 
entitlements based on the Nansha Islands under the Convention, all maritime features 
comprising the Nansha Islands must be taken into account.  
 
22. The Philippines, by requesting the Arbitral Tribunal to determine the maritime 
entitlements of only what it describes as the maritime features "occupied or 
controlled by China", has in effect dissected the Nansha Islands. It deliberately 
makes no mention of the rest of the Nansha Islands, including those illegally seized or 
claimed by the Philippines. Its real intention is to gainsay China's sovereignty over 
the whole of the Nansha Islands, deny the fact of its illegal seizure of or claim on 
several maritime features of the Nansha Islands, and distort the nature and scope of 
the China-Philippines disputes in the South China Sea. In addition, the Philippines 
has deliberately excluded from the category of the maritime features "occupied or 
controlled by China" the largest island in the Nansha Islands, Taiping Dao, which is 
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currently controlled by the Taiwan authorities of China. This is a grave violation of 
the One-China Principle and an infringement of China's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. This further shows that the second category of claims brought by the 
Philippines essentially pertains to the territorial sovereignty dispute between the two 
countries. 
 
23. Finally, whether or not low-tide elevations can be appropriated is plainly a 
question of territorial sovereignty. 
 
24. The Philippines asserts that some of the maritime features, about which it has 
submitted claims for arbitration, are low-tide elevations, thus being incapable of 
appropriation as territory. As to whether those features are indeed low-tide 
elevations, this Position Paper will not comment. It should, however, be pointed out 
that, whatever nature those features possess, the Philippines itself has persisted in 
claiming sovereignty over them since the 1970s. By Presidential Decree No. 1596, 
promulgated on 11 June 1978, the Philippines made known its unlawful claim to 
sovereignty over some maritime features in the Nansha Islands including the 
aforementioned features, together with the adjacent but vast areas of waters, sea-bed, 
subsoil, continental margin and superjacent airspace, and constituted the vast area 
as a new municipality of the province of Palawan, entitled "Kalayaan". 
Notwithstanding that Philippine Republic Act No. 9522 of 10 March 2009 stipulates 
that the maritime zones for the so-called "Kalayaan Island Group" (i.e., some 
maritime features of China's Nansha Islands) and "Scarborough Shoal" (i.e., China's 
Huangyan Dao) be determined in a way consistent with Article 121 of the Convention 
(i.e., the regime of islands), this provision was designed to adjust the Philippines' 
maritime claims based on those features within the aforementioned area. The Act did 
not vary the territorial claim of the Philippines to the relevant maritime features, 
including those it alleged in this arbitration as low-tide elevations. In Note Verbale 
No. 000228, addressed to Secretary-General of the United Nations on 5 April 2011, 
the Philippine Permanent Mission to the United Nations stated that, "the Kalayaan 
Island Group (KIG) constitutes an integral part of the Philippines. The Republic of 
the Philippines has sovereignty and jurisdiction over the geological features in the 
KIG." The Philippines has maintained, to date, its claim to sovereignty over 40 
maritime features in the Nansha Islands, among which are the very features it now 
labels as low-tide elevations. It is thus obvious that the only motive behind the 
Philippines' assertion that low-tide elevations cannot be appropriated is to deny 
China's sovereignty over these features so as to place them under Philippine 
sovereignty.  
 
25. Whether low-tide elevations can be appropriated as territory is in itself a question 
of territorial sovereignty, not a matter concerning the interpretation or application of 
the Convention. The Convention is silent on this issue of appropriation. In its 2001 
Judgment in Qatar v. Bahrain, the ICJ explicitly stated that, "International treaty law 
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is silent on the question whether low-tide elevations can be considered to be 
'territory'. Nor is the Court aware of a uniform and widespread State practice which 
might have given rise to a customary rule which unequivocally permits or excludes 
appropriation of low-tide elevations" (Qatar v. Bahrain, I.C.J. Reports 2001, pp. 
101-102, para. 205). "International treaty law" plainly includes the Convention, 
which entered into force in 1994. In its 2012 Judgment in Nicaragua v. Colombia, 
while the ICJ stated that "low-tide elevations cannot be appropriated" (Nicaragua v. 
Colombia, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 641, para. 26), it did not point to any legal basis 
for this conclusory statement. Nor did it touch upon the legal status of low-tide 
elevations as components of an archipelago, or sovereignty or claims of sovereignty 
that may have long existed over such features in a particular maritime area. On all 
accounts, the ICJ did not apply the Convention in that case. Whether or not low-tide 
elevations can be appropriated is not a question concerning the interpretation or 
application of the Convention. 
 
26. As to the third category of the Philippines' claims, China maintains that the 
legality of China's actions in the waters of the Nansha Islands and Huangyan Dao 
rests on both its sovereignty over relevant maritime features and the maritime rights 
derived therefrom. 
 
27. The Philippines alleges that China's claim to and exercise of maritime rights in 
the South China Sea have unlawfully interfered with the sovereign rights, jurisdiction 
and rights and freedom of navigation, which the Philippines is entitled to enjoy and 
exercise under the Convention. The premise for this claim must be that the spatial 
extent of the Philippines' maritime jurisdiction is defined and undisputed, and that 
China's actions have encroached upon such defined areas. The fact is, however, to 
the contrary. China and the Philippines have not delimited the maritime space 
between them. Until and unless the sovereignty over the relevant maritime features is 
ascertained and maritime delimitation completed, this category of claims of the 
Philippines cannot be decided upon.  
 
28. It should be particularly emphasized that China always respects the freedom of 
navigation and overflight enjoyed by all States in the South China Sea in accordance 
with international law. 
 
29. To sum up, by requesting the Arbitral Tribunal to apply the Convention to 
determine the extent of China's maritime rights in the South China Sea, without first 
having ascertained sovereignty over the relevant maritime features, and by 
formulating a series of claims for arbitration to that effect, the Philippines 
contravenes the general principles of international law and international 
jurisprudence on the settlement of international maritime disputes. To decide upon 
any of the Philippines' claims, the Arbitral Tribunal would inevitably have to 
determine, directly or indirectly, the sovereignty over both the maritime features in 
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question and other maritime features in the South China Sea. Besides, such a 
decision would unavoidably produce, in practical terms, the effect of a maritime 
delimitation, which will be further discussed below in Part IV of this Position Paper. 
Therefore, China maintains that the Arbitral Tribunal manifestly has no jurisdiction 
over the present case. 
 
III. There exists an agreement between China and the Philippines to settle their 
disputes in the South China Sea through negotiations, and the Philippines is 
debarred from unilaterally initiating compulsory arbitration 
 
30. With regard to disputes concerning territorial sovereignty and maritime rights, 
China has always maintained that they should be peacefully resolved through 
negotiations between the countries directly concerned. In the present case, there has 
been a long-standing agreement between China and the Philippines on resolving 
their disputes in the South China Sea through friendly consultations and negotiations. 
 
31. Under the Joint Statement between the People's Republic of China and the 
Republic of the Philippines concerning Consultations on the South China Sea and on 
Other Areas of Cooperation, issued on 10 August 1995, both sides "agreed to abide 
by" the principles that "[d]isputes shall be settled in a peaceful and friendly manner 
through consultations on the basis of equality and mutual respect" (Point 1); that "a 
gradual and progressive process of cooperation shall be adopted with a view to 
eventually negotiating a settlement of the bilateral disputes" (Point 3); and that 
"[d]isputes shall be settled by the countries directly concerned without prejudice to 
the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea" (Point 8). 
 
32. The Joint Statement of the China-Philippines Experts Group Meeting on 
Confidence-Building Measures, issued on 23 March 1999, states that the two sides 
reiterated their commitment to "[t]he understanding to continue to work for a 
settlement of their difference through friendly consultations" (para. 5), and that "the 
two sides believe that the channels of consultations between China and the 
Philippines are unobstructed. They have agreed that the dispute should be peacefully 
settled through consultation" (para. 12). 
 
33. The Joint Statement between the Government of the People's Republic of China 
and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines on the Framework of Bilateral 
Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century, issued on 16 May 2000, states in Point 9 
that, "The two sides commit themselves to the maintenance of peace and stability in 
the South China Sea. They agree to promote a peaceful settlement of disputes through 
bilateral friendly consultations and negotiations in accordance with universally-
recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. They reaffirm their adherence to the 1995 joint 




34. The Joint Press Statement of the Third China-Philippines Experts' Group Meeting 
on Confidence-Building Measures, dated 4 April 2001, states in Point 4 that, "The 
two sides noted that the bilateral consultation mechanism to explore ways of 
cooperation in the South China Sea has been effective. The series of understanding 
and consensus reached by the two sides have played a constructive role in the 
maintenance of the sound development of China-Philippines relations and peace and 
stability of the South China Sea area."  
 
35. The mutual understanding between China and the Philippines to settle relevant 
disputes through negotiations has been reaffirmed in a multilateral instrument. On 4 
November 2002, Mr. Wang Yi, the then Vice Foreign Minister and representative of 
the Chinese Government, together with the representatives of the governments of the 
member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN"), including 
the Philippines, jointly signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South 
China Sea ("DOC"). Paragraph 4 of the DOC explicitly states that, "The Parties 
concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by 
peaceful means ... through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states 
directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of 
international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea." 
 
36. Following the signing of the DOC, the leaders of China and the Philippines have 
repeatedly reiterated their commitment to the settlement of disputes by way of 
dialogue. Thus, a Joint Press Statement between the Government of the People's 
Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines was issued 
on 3 September 2004 during the State visit to China by the then Philippine President 
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, which states in paragraph 16 that, "They agreed that the 
early and vigorous implementation of the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea will pave the way for the transformation of 
the South China Sea into an area of cooperation." 
 
37. Between 30 August and 3 September 2011, President Benigno S. Aquino III of the 
Philippines paid a State visit to China. On 1 September 2011, the two sides issued a 
Joint Statement between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of the 
Philippines, which, in paragraph 15, "reiterated their commitment to addressing the 
disputes through peaceful dialogue" and "reaffirmed their commitments to respect 
and abide by the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 
signed by China and the ASEAN member countries in 2002". The Joint Statement, 
consequently, reaffirmed Paragraph 4 of the DOC relating to settlement of relevant 
disputes by negotiations. 
 
38. The bilateral instruments between China and the Philippines repeatedly employ 
the term "agree" when referring to settlement of their disputes through negotiations. 
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This evinces a clear intention to establish an obligation between the two countries in 
this regard. Paragraph 4 of the DOC employs the term "undertake", which is also 
frequently used in international agreements to commit the parties to their obligations. 
As the ICJ observed in its Judgment in Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and 
Montenegro, "[t]he ordinary meaning of the word 'undertake' is to give a formal 
promise, to bind or engage oneself, to give a pledge or promise, to agree, to accept 
an obligation. It is a word regularly used in treaties setting out the obligations of the 
Contracting Parties .... It is not merely hortatory or purposive" (Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007, I.C.J. 
Reports 2007, p. 111, para. 162). Furthermore, under international law, regardless 
of the designation or form the above-mentioned instruments employ, as long as they 
intend to create rights and obligations for the parties, these rights and obligations 
are binding between the parties (Cf. Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions 
between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 
Judgment of 1 July 1994, I.C.J. Reports 1994, pp. 120-121, paras. 22-26; Land and 
Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: 
Equitorial Guinea intervening), Judgment of 10 October 2002, I.C.J. Reports 2002, 
pp. 427, 429, paras. 258, 262-263).  
 
39. The relevant provisions in the aforementioned bilateral instruments and the DOC 
are mutually reinforcing and form an agreement between China and the Philippines. 
On that basis, they have undertaken a mutual obligation to settle their relevant 
disputes through negotiations. 
 
40. By repeatedly reaffirming negotiations as the means for settling relevant disputes, 
and by emphasizing that negotiations be conducted by sovereign States directly 
concerned, the above-quoted provisions of the bilateral instruments and Paragraph 4 
of the DOC obviously have produced the effect of excluding any means of third-party 
settlement. In particular, the above-mentioned Joint Statement between the People's 
Republic of China and the Republic of the Philippines concerning Consultations on 
the South China Sea and on Other Areas of Cooperation of 10 August 1995 stipulates 
in Point 3 that "a gradual and progressive process of cooperation shall be adopted 
with a view to eventually negotiating a settlement of the bilateral disputes". The term 
"eventually" in this context clearly serves to emphasize that "negotiations" is the only 
means the parties have chosen for dispute settlement, to the exclusion of any other 
means including third-party settlement procedures. Although the above-mentioned 
bilateral instruments and Paragraph 4 of the DOC do not use such an express phrase 
as "exclude other procedures of dispute settlement", as the arbitral tribunal in the 
Southern Bluefin Tuna Case stated in its Award, "the absence of an express exclusion 
of any procedure ... is not decisive" (Australia and New Zealand v. Japan, Award on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 4 August 2000, p.97, para. 57). As discussed earlier, 
in respect of disputes relating to territorial sovereignty and maritime rights, China 
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always insists on peaceful settlement of disputes by means of negotiations between 
the countries directly concerned. China's position on negotiations was made clear 
and well known to the Philippines and other relevant parties during the drafting and 
adoption of the aforementioned bilateral instruments and the DOC. 
 
41. Consequently, with regard to all the disputes between China and the Philippines 
in the South China Sea, including the Philippines' claims in this arbitration, the only 
means of settlement as agreed by the two sides is negotiations, to the exclusion of any 
other means. 
 
42. Even supposing that the Philippines' claims were concerned with the 
interpretation or application of the Convention, the compulsory procedures laid 
down in section 2 of Part XV of the Convention still could not be applied, given the 
agreement between China and the Philippines on settling their relevant disputes 
through negotiations. 
 
43. Article 280 of the Convention states that, "Nothing in this Part impairs the right 
of any States Parties to agree at any time to settle a dispute between them concerning 
the interpretation or application of this Convention by any peaceful means of their 
own choice." Article 281 (1) provides that, "If the States Parties which are parties to 
a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention have agreed 
to seek settlement of the dispute by a peaceful means of their own choice, the 
procedures provided for in this Part apply only where no settlement has been reached 
by recourse to such means and the agreement between the parties does not exclude 
any further procedure." 
 
44. As analysed above, through bilateral and multilateral instruments, China and the 
Philippines have agreed to settle their relevant disputes by negotiations, without 
setting any time limit for the negotiations, and have excluded any other means of 
settlement. In these circumstances, it is evident that, under the above-quoted 
provisions of the Convention, the relevant disputes between the two States shall be 
resolved through negotiations and there shall be no recourse to arbitration or other 
compulsory procedures. 
 
45. The Philippines claims that, the two countries have been involved in exchanges of 
views since 1995 with regard to the subject-matter of the Philippines' claims for 
arbitration, without however reaching settlement, and that in its view, the Philippines 
is justified in believing that it is meaningless to continue the negotiations, and 
therefore the Philippines has the right to initiate arbitration. But the truth is that the 





46. Under international law, general exchanges of views, without having the purpose 
of settling a given dispute, do not constitute negotiations. In Georgia v. Russian 
Federation, the ICJ held that, "Negotiations entail more than the plain opposition of 
legal views or interests between two parties, or the existence of a series of 
accusations and rebuttals, or even the exchange of claims and directly opposed 
counter-claims. As such, the concept of 'negotiations' … requires - at the very least - 
a genuine attempt by one of the disputing parties to engage in discussions with the 
other disputing party, with a view to resolving the dispute" (Application of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 1 April 2011, 
I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 132, para. 157). In addition, the ICJ considered that "the 
subject-matter of the negotiations must relate to the subject-matter of the dispute 
which, in turn, must concern the substantive obligations contained in the treaty in 
question" (Ibid., p. 133, para. 161). 
 
47. The South China Sea issue involves a number of countries, and it is no easy task 
to solve it. Up to the present, the countries concerned are still working together to 
create conditions conducive to its final settlement by negotiations. Against this 
background, the exchanges of views between China and the Philippines in relation to 
their disputes have so far pertained to responding to incidents at sea in the disputed 
areas and promoting measures to prevent conflicts, reduce frictions, maintain 
stability in the region, and promote measures of cooperation. They are far from 
constituting negotiations even on the evidence presented by the Philippines. 
 
48. In recent years, China has on a number of occasions proposed to the Philippines 
the establishment of a China-Philippines regular consultation mechanism on 
maritime issues. To date, there has never been any response from the Philippines. On 
1 September 2011, the two countries issued a Joint Statement between the People's 
Republic of China and the Republic of Philippines, reiterating the commitment to 
settling their disputes in the South China Sea through negotiations. But, before 
negotiations could formally begin, the Philippines sent on 10 April 2012 a naval 
vessel to the waters of China's Huangyan Dao to seize Chinese fishing boats together 
with the Chinese fishermen on board. In the face of such provocations, China was 
forced to take response measures to safeguard its sovereignty. Thereafter, China 
once again proposed to the Philippine Government that the two sides restart the 
China-Philippines consultation mechanism for confidence-building measures. That 
proposal again fell on deaf ears. On 26 April 2012, the Philippine Department of 
Foreign Affairs delivered a note verbale to the Chinese Embassy in the Philippines, 
proposing that the issue of Huangyan Dao be referred to a third-party adjudication 
body for resolution and indicating no willingness to negotiate. On 22 January 2013, 




49. The previous exchanges of views regarding the South China Sea issue between 
the two countries did not concern the subject-matter of the Philippines' claims for 
arbitration. For instance, the Philippines cited a statement released by the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry on 22 May 1997 regarding Huangyan Dao, in order to show that 
there exists between the two countries a dispute concerning the maritime rights of 
Huangyan Dao and that the two countries had exchanged views with regard to that 
dispute. However, the Philippines deliberately omitted a passage from that statement, 
which reads: "The issue of Huangyandao is an issue of territorial sovereignty; the 
development and exploitation of the EEZ is a question of maritime jurisdiction, the 
nature of the two issues are different and hence the laws and regulations governing 
them are also different, and they should not be discussed together. The attempt of the 
Philippine side to use maritime jurisdictional rights to violate the territorial 
sovereignty of China is untenable." This passage makes clear the thrust of the 
statement: the Philippines shall not negate China's sovereignty over Huangyan Dao 
on the pretext that it is situated within the EEZ of the Philippines. This shows that the 
exchange of views in question was centred on the issue of sovereignty. 
 
50. It should be further noted that, the Philippines has attempted to show that the 
subject-matter of the exchanges of views between China and the Philippines since 
1995 concerns the interpretation or application of the Convention, but nothing could 
be farther from the truth than this. Historically, the Philippines, by Republic Act No. 
3046 of 17 June 1961, proclaimed as part of its territorial sea the vast areas of sea 
between the most outlying islands in the Philippine archipelago and the treaty limits 
established in the Treaty of Paris concluded between the United States and Spain in 
1898, among other international treaties, thus claiming a belt of territorial sea far 
beyond 12 nautical miles. By Presidential Decree No. 1596 promulgated on 11 June 
1978, the Philippines made its claim for sovereignty over the so-called "Kalayaan 
Island Group" (i.e., some maritime features of China's Nansha Islands), together with 
the adjacent but vast areas of waters, sea-bed, subsoil, continental margin, and 
superjacent airspace. As conceded by the Philippines itself, only with the adoption on 
10 March 2009 of Republic Act No. 9522 did it begin the ongoing process to 
harmonize its domestic law with the Convention, with a view to eventually 
relinquishing all its maritime claims incompatible with the Convention. That Act 
provided, for the first time, that the maritime areas of the so-called "Kalayaan Island 
Group" (i.e., some maritime features of China's Nansha Islands) and "Scarborough 
Shoal" (i.e., China's Huangyan Dao) "shall be determined" so as to be "consistent 
with Article 121" of the Convention (i.e., the regime of islands). Therefore, given that 
the Philippines itself considers that only in 2009 did it start to abandon its former 
maritime claims in conflict with the Convention, how could it have started in 1995 to 
exchange views with China on matters concerning the interpretation or application of 




51. The Philippines claims that China cannot invoke Paragraph 4 of the DOC to 
exclude the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal, given its own grave breach of the 
terms of the DOC. This is groundless. In support of its allegations against China, the 
Philippines claims that China has taken measures including the threat of force to 
drive away Philippine fishermen from the waters of Huangyan Dao in spite of their 
long-standing and continuous fishing activities in those waters, and that China has 
blocked the Philippines from resupplying a naval ship which ran and has stayed 
aground at Ren'ai Jiao and certain navy personnel on board. But the fact is that, 
regarding the situation at Huangyan Dao, it was the Philippines that first resorted to 
the threat of force by dispatching on 10 April 2012 a naval vessel to detain and arrest 
Chinese fishing boats and fishermen in the waters of Huangyan Dao. Regarding the 
situation at Ren'ai Jiao, which is a constituent part of China's Nansha Islands, the 
Philippines illegally ran a naval ship aground in May 1999 at that feature on the 
pretext of "technical difficulties". China has made repeated representations to the 
Philippines, demanding that the latter immediately tow away the vessel. The 
Philippines, for its part, had on numerous occasions made explicit undertaking to 
China to tow away the vessel grounded due to "technical difficulties". However, for 
over 15 years, instead of fulfilling that undertaking, the Philippines has attempted to 
construct permanent installations on Ren'ai Jiao. On 14 March 2014, the Philippines 
even openly declared that the vessel was deployed as a permanent installation on 
Ren'ai Jiao in 1999. China has been forced to take necessary measures in response to 
such provocative conduct. In light of these facts, the Philippines' accusations against 
China are baseless. 
 
52. While it denies the effect of Paragraph 4 of the DOC for the purpose of 
supporting its institution of the present arbitration, the Philippines recently called on 
the parties to the DOC to comply with Paragraph 5 of the DOC and to provide "the 
full and effective implementation of the DOC", in a proposal made in its Department 
of Foreign Affairs statement dated 1 August 2014. This selective and self-
contradictory tactic clearly violates the principle of good faith in international law. 
 
53. The principle of good faith requires all States to honestly interpret agreements 
they enter into with others, not to misinterpret them in disregard of their authentic 
meaning in order to obtain an unfair advantage. This principle is of overriding 
importance and is incorporated in Article 2(2) of the Charter of the United Nations. 
It touches every aspect of international law (Cf. Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur 
Watts (eds.), Oppenheim's International Law, 9th ed., 1992, vol. 1, p. 38). In the 
Nuclear Tests Case, the ICJ held that, "One of the basic principles governing the 
creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever their source, is the principle 
of good faith. Trust and confidence are inherent in international co-operation" 
(Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France), Judgment of 20 December 1974, I.C.J. 




54. On this occasion, China wishes to emphasize that the DOC is an important 
instrument, adopted by China and the ASEAN member States following many years of 
arduous negotiations on the basis of mutual respect, mutual understanding and 
mutual accommodation. Under the DOC, the parties concerned undertake to resolve 
their territorial and jurisdictional disputes through friendly consultations and 
negotiations by sovereign States directly concerned. In addition, the parties reaffirm 
their commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, 
the 1982 Convention, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the 
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and other universally recognized principles 
of international law which shall serve as the basic norms governing state-to-state 
relations. The Parties commit themselves to exploring ways for building trust and 
confidence in accordance with the above-mentioned principles and on the basis of 
equality and mutual respect; reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the 
freedom of navigation in, and overflight above, the South China Sea as provided for 
by universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 
Convention; and undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that 
would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, 
among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited 
islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features, and to handle their differences in a 
constructive manner. The DOC also lists a number of ways to build trust and areas of 
cooperation for the Parties concerned to seek and explore pending the peaceful 
settlement of territorial and jurisdictional disputes. As a follow-up to the DOC, the 
parties have undertaken to negotiate a "Code of Conduct in the South China Sea". 
 
55. The DOC has played a positive role in maintaining stability in the South China 
Sea, and in enhancing maritime cooperation, building trust and reducing misgivings 
between China and the ASEAN member States. Every provision of the DOC 
constitutes an integral part of the document. To deny the significance of the DOC will 
lead to a serious retrogression from the current relationship of cooperation between 
China and the ASEAN member States in the South China Sea. 
 
56. As a member of the ASEAN and having been involved throughout the 
consultations on the DOC, the Philippines should have fully appreciated the 
significance of the DOC for the peaceful settlement of the disputes in the South China 
Sea through negotiations. At present, in order to maintain stability in the region and 
create conditions for peaceful settlement of the South China Sea issue, China and the 
ASEAN member States have established working mechanisms to effectively implement 
the DOC, and have been engaged in consultations regarding the "Code of Conduct in 
the South China Sea". By initiating compulsory arbitration at this juncture, the 
Philippines is running counter to the common wish and joint efforts of China and the 
ASEAN member States. Its underlying goal is not, as the Philippines has proclaimed, 
to seek peaceful resolution of the South China Sea issue, but rather, by resorting to 
arbitration, to put political pressure on China, so as to deny China's lawful rights in 
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the South China Sea through the so-called "interpretation or application" of the 
Convention, and to pursue a resolution of the South China Sea issue on its own terms. 








IV. Even assuming, arguendo, that the subject-matter of the arbitration were 
concerned with the interpretation or application of the Convention, that subject-
matter would still be an integral part of maritime delimitation and, having been 
excluded by the 2006 Declaration filed by China, could not be submitted for 
arbitration 
 
57. Part XV of the Convention establishes the right for the States Parties to file a 
written declaration to exclude specified categories of disputes from the compulsory 
dispute settlement procedures as laid down in section 2 of that Part. In 2006 China 
filed such a declaration in full compliance with the Convention. 
 
58. On 25 August 2006, China deposited, pursuant to Article 298 of the Convention, 
with Secretary-General of the United Nations a written declaration, stating that,"The 
Government of the People's Republic of China does not accept any of the procedures 
provided for in section 2 of Part XV of the Convention with respect to all the 
categories of disputes referred to in paragraph 1 (a), (b) and (c) of Article 298 of the 
Convention". In other words, as regards disputes concerning maritime delimitation, 
historic bays or titles, military and law enforcement activities, and disputes in respect 
of which the Security Council of the United Nations is exercising the functions 
assigned to it by the Charter of the United Nations, the Chinese Government does not 
accept any of the compulsory dispute settlement procedures laid down in section 2 of 
Part XV of the Convention, including compulsory arbitration. China firmly believes 
that the most effective means for settlement of maritime disputes between China and 
its neighbouring States is that of friendly consultations and negotiations between the 
sovereign States directly concerned.  
59. China and the Philippines are maritime neighbours and "States with opposite or 
adjacent coasts" in the sense of Articles 74 and 83 of the Convention. There exists an 
issue of maritime delimitation between the two States. Given that disputes between 
China and the Philippines relating to territorial sovereignty over relevant maritime 
features remain unresolved, the two States have yet to start negotiations on maritime 





60. On 3 September 2004, the two sides issued a Joint Press Statement of the 
Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of 
the Philippines, stating that "[t]he two sides reaffirmed their commitment to the 
peace and stability in the South China Sea and their readiness to continue 
discussions to study cooperative activities like joint development pending the 
comprehensive and final settlement of territorial disputes and overlapping maritime 
claims in the area" (para. 16). 
 
61. Two days before the issuance of the Joint Press Statement, upon approval by both 
governments and in the presence of the Heads of State of the two countries, China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation and Philippine National Oil Company signed the 
"Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in Certain Areas in the South 
China Sea". On 14 March 2005, the agreement was expanded to a tripartite 
agreement, with the participation of Vietnam Oil and Gas Corporation. This is a 
good example of the constructive efforts made by the States concerned to enhance 
cooperation and create conditions for a negotiated settlement of the disputes in the 
South China Sea. The maritime area covered by that agreement is within that covered 
in the present arbitration initiated by the Philippines. 
62. On 28 April 2005, during a State visit to the Philippines by the then Chinese 
President Hu Jintao, China and the Philippines issued a Joint Statement of the 
People's Republic of China and the Republic of the Philippines, in which the two 
sides "agreed to continue efforts to maintain peace and stability in the South China 
Sea and ... welcomed the signing of the Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine 
Seismic Undertaking in the Agreement Area in the South China Sea by China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation, Vietnam Oil and Gas Corporation and Philippine 
National Oil Company" (para. 16). 
 
63. On 16 January 2007, during the official visit to the Philippines by the then 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, China and the Philippines issued a Joint Statement of 
the People's Republic of China and the Republic of the Philippines, which stated that 
"the Tripartite Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the South China Sea serves as a 
model for cooperation in the region. They agreed that possible next steps for 
cooperation among the three parties should be explored to bring collaboration to a 
higher level and increase the momentum of trust and confidence in the region" (para. 
12). 
 
64. In light of the above, it is plain that China and the Philippines have reached 
mutual understanding to advance final resolution of the issue of maritime 
delimitation through cooperation. In any event, given China's 2006 declaration, the 
Philippines should not and cannot unilaterally initiate compulsory arbitration on the 




65. To cover up the maritime delimitation nature of the China-Philippines dispute 
and to sidestep China's 2006 declaration, the Philippines has split up the dispute of 
maritime delimitation into discrete issues and selected a few of them for arbitration, 
requesting the Arbitral Tribunal to render the so-called "legal interpretation" on 
each of them. 
 
66. It is not difficult to see that such legal issues as those presented by the Philippines 
in the present arbitration, including maritime claims, the legal nature of maritime 
features, the extent of relevant maritime rights, and law enforcement activities at sea, 
are all fundamental issues dealt with in past cases of maritime delimitation decided 
by international judicial or arbitral bodies and in State practice concerning maritime 
delimitation. In short, those issues are part and parcel of maritime delimitation. 
 
67. Maritime delimitation is an integral, systematic process. Articles 74 and 83 of the 
Convention stipulate that maritime delimitation between States with opposite or 
adjacent coasts "shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as 
referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order 
to achieve an equitable solution". Both international jurisprudence and State practice 
have recognized that all relevant factors must be taken into account to achieve an 
equitable solution. In this light, the international law applicable to maritime 
delimitation includes both the Convention and general international law. Under this 
body of law, maritime delimitation involves a consideration of not only entitlements, 
effect of maritime features, and principles and methods of delimitation, but also all 
relevant factors that must be taken into account, in order to attain an equitable 
solution. 
 
68. The issues presented by the Philippines for arbitration constitute an integral part 
of maritime delimitation between China and the Philippines, and, as such, can only 
be considered under the overarching framework of maritime delimitation between 
China and the Philippines, and in conjunction with all the relevant rights and 
interests the parties concerned enjoy in accordance with the Convention, general 
international law, and historical or long-standing practice in the region for overall 
consideration. The Philippines' approach of splitting its maritime delimitation dispute 
with China and selecting some of the issues for arbitration, if permitted, will 
inevitably destroy the integrity and indivisibility of maritime delimitation and 
contravene the principle that maritime delimitation must be based on international 
law as referred to in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute and that "all relevant factors must 
be taken into account". This will adversely affect the future equitable solution of the 
dispute of maritime delimitation between China and the Philippines. 
 
69. Ostensibly, the Philippines is not seeking from the Arbitral Tribunal a ruling 
regarding maritime delimitation, but instead a decision, inter alia, that certain 
maritime features are part of the Philippines' EEZ and continental shelf, and that 
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China has unlawfully interfered with the enjoyment and exercise by the Philippines of 
sovereign rights in its EEZ and continental shelf. But that obviously is an attempt to 
seek a recognition by the Arbitral Tribunal that the relevant maritime areas are part 
of the Philippines' EEZ and continental shelf, in respect of which the Philippines is 
entitled to exercise sovereign rights and jurisdiction. This is actually a request for 
maritime delimitation by the Arbitral Tribunal in disguise. The Philippines' claims 
have in effect covered the main aspects and steps in maritime delimitation. Should the 
Arbitral Tribunal address substantively the Philippines' claims, it would amount to a 
de facto maritime delimitation. 
70. The exclusionary declarations filed by the States Parties to the Convention under 
Article 298 of the Convention must be respected. By initiating the present compulsory 
arbitration as an attempt to circumvent China's 2006 declaration, the Philippines is 
abusing the dispute settlement procedures under the Convention. 
 
71. China's 2006 declaration, once filed, automatically comes into effect. Its effect, as 
prescribed under Article 299 of the Convention, is that, without the consent of China, 
no State Party can unilaterally invoke any of the compulsory procedures specified in 
section 2 of Part XV against China in respect of the disputes covered by that 
declaration. In return, China simultaneously gives up the right to unilaterally initiate 
compulsory procedures against other States Parties in respect of the same disputes. 
The rights and obligations are reciprocal in this regard. 
 
72. The Philippines claims that, having chosen none of the four compulsory dispute 
settlement procedures listed under Article 287 of the Convention, China as a State 
Party shall therefore be deemed to have accepted compulsory arbitration. This is a 
deliberately misleading argument. The purpose and the effect of China's 2006 
declaration is such that the disputes listed therein are fully excluded from the 
compulsory settlement procedures under the Convention. Whether or not China has 
selected any of the four compulsory procedures under Article 287, as long as a 
dispute falls within the scope of China's 2006 declaration, China has already 
explicitly excluded it from the applicability of any compulsory procedures under 
section 2 of Part XV of the Convention, including compulsory arbitration. 
 
73. Although the Philippines professes that the subject-matter of the arbitration does 
not involve any dispute covered by China's 2006 declaration, since China holds a 
different view in this regard, the Philippines should first take up this issue with 
China, before a decision can be taken on whether or not it can be submitted for 
arbitration. Should the Philippines' logic in its present form be followed, any State 
Party may unilaterally initiate compulsory arbitration against another State Party in 
respect of a dispute covered by the latter's declaration in force simply by asserting 
that the dispute is not excluded from arbitration by that declaration. This would 




74. Since the entry into force of the Convention, the present arbitration is the first 
case in which a State Party has unilaterally initiated compulsory arbitration in 
respect of a dispute covered by a declaration of another State Party under Article 
298. If this twisted approach of the Philippines could be accepted as fulfilling the 
conditions for invoking compulsory arbitration, it could be well imagined that any of 
the disputes listed in Article 298 may be submitted to the compulsory procedures 
under section 2 of Part XV simply by connecting them, using the Philippines' 
approach, with the question of interpretation or application of certain provisions of 
the Convention. Should the above approach be deemed acceptable, the question 
would then arise as to whether the provisions of Article 298 could still retain any 
value, and whether there is any practical meaning left of the declarations so far filed 
by 35 States Parties under Article 298. In light of the foregoing reasons, China can 
only conclude that, the unilateral initiation by the Philippines of the present 
arbitration constitutes an abuse of the compulsory procedures provided in the 
Convention and a grave challenge to the solemnity of the dispute settlement 
mechanism under the Convention. 
75. To sum up, even assuming that the subject-matter of the arbitration were 
concerned with the interpretation or application of the Convention, it would still be 
an integral part of the dispute of maritime delimitation between the two States. 
Having been excluded by China's 2006 declaration, it could not be submitted to 
compulsory arbitration under the Convention. 
 
V. China's right to freely choose the means of dispute settlement must be fully 
respected, and its rejection of and non-participation in the present arbitration is 
solidly grounded in international law 
 
76. Under international law, every State is free to choose the means of dispute 
settlement. The jurisdiction of any international judicial or arbitral body over an 
inter-State dispute depends on the prior consent of the parties to the dispute. This is 
known as the principle of consent in international law. It was on the basis of this 
principle that the States participating in the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea reached, after extended and arduous negotiations, a compromise on 
Part XV relating to dispute settlement as a package deal.  
 
77. The compulsory dispute settlement procedures provided in Part XV of the 
Convention apply only to disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the 
Convention. States Parties are entitled to freely choose the means of settlement other 
than those set out in Part XV. Articles 297 and 298 of the Convention, moreover, 
provide for limitations on and optional exceptions to the applicability of the 
compulsory procedures with regard to specified categories of disputes. 
 
78. The balance embodied in the provisions of Part XV has been a critical factor for 
the decision of many States to become parties to the Convention. At the second 
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session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Ambassador 
Reynaldo Galindo Pohl of El Salvador, co-chair of the informal group on the 
settlement of disputes, on introducing the first general draft on dispute settlement, 
emphasized the need for exceptions from compulsory jurisdiction with respect to 
questions directly related to the territorial integrity of States. Otherwise, as has been 
noted, "a number of States might have been dissuaded from ratifying the Convention 
or even signing it" (Shabtai Rosenne and Louis B. Sohn (eds.), United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, 1989, vol. v, p. 88, para. 
297.1). It follows that the provisions of Part XV must be interpreted and applied in 
such a manner so as to preserve the balance in and the integrity of Part XV. 
 
79. China highly values the positive role played by the compulsory dispute settlement 
procedures of the Convention in upholding the international legal order for the 
oceans. As a State Party to the Convention, China has accepted the provisions of 
section 2 of Part XV on compulsory dispute settlement procedures. But that 
acceptance does not mean that those procedures apply to disputes of territorial 
sovereignty, or disputes which China has agreed with other States Parties to settle by 
means of their own choice, or disputes already excluded by Article 297 and China's 
2006 declaration filed under Article 298. With regard to the Philippines' claims for 
arbitration, China has never accepted any of the compulsory procedures of section 2 
of Part XV.  
 
80. By virtue of the principle of sovereignty, parties to a dispute may choose the 
means of settlement of their own accord. This has been affirmed by the Convention. 
Article 280 provides that, "Nothing in this Part impairs the right of any States Parties 
to agree at any time to settle a dispute between them concerning the interpretation or 
application of this Convention by any peaceful means of their own choice." 
 
81. The means thus chosen by the States Parties to the Convention takes priority over 
the compulsory procedures set forth in section 2 of Part XV. Article 281(1) of section 
1 of Part XV provides that, "If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute 
concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention have agreed to seek 
settlement of the dispute by a peaceful means of their own choice, the procedures 
provided for in this Part apply only where no settlement has been reached by 
recourse to such means and the agreement between the parties does not exclude any 
further procedure." Article 286 states that, "Subject to section 3, any dispute 
concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention shall, where no 
settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1, be submitted at the request of 
any party to the dispute to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this 
section." Accordingly, where parties to a dispute have already chosen a means of 
settlement and excluded other procedures, the compulsory procedures of the 




82. The priority and significance of the means of dispute settlement chosen by States 
Parties to the Convention have been further affirmed in the arbitral award in the 
Southern Bluefin Tuna Case. The tribunal recognized that the Convention "falls 
significantly short of establishing a truly comprehensive regime of compulsory 
jurisdiction entailing binding decisions", and that "States Parties ... are permitted by 
Article 281(1) to confine the applicability of compulsory procedures of section 2 of 
Part XV to cases where all parties to the dispute have agreed upon submission of 
their dispute to such compulsory procedures" (Australia and New Zealand v. Japan, 
pp. 102-103, para. 62). Were the provisions of section 1 of Part XV not complied with 
faithfully, it would result in deprivation of the right of the States Parties to freely 
choose means of peaceful settlement based on State sovereignty. That would entail a 
breach of the principle of consent and upset the balance in and integrity of Part XV.  
 
83. In exercise of its power to decide on its jurisdiction, any judicial or arbitral body 
should respect the right of the States Parties to the Convention to freely choose the 
means of settlement. Article 288(4) of the Convention provides that "[i]n the event of 
a dispute as to whether a court or tribunal has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled 
by decision of that court or tribunal". China respects that competence of judicial or 
arbitral bodies under the Convention. Equally important, China would like to 
emphasize, the exercise of judicial or arbitral power shall not derogate from the right 
of the States Parties to choose the means of settlement of their own accord, or from 
the principle of consent which must be followed in international adjudication and 
arbitration. China holds that this is the constraint that the Arbitral Tribunal must 
abide by when considering whether or not to apply Article 288(4) in determining its 
jurisdiction in the present arbitration. After all, "the parties to the dispute are 
complete masters of the procedure to be used to settle it" (Shabtai Rosenne and Louis 
B. Sohn (eds.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A 
Commentary, 1989, vol. v, p. 20, para. 280.1). 
 
84. China respects the right of all States Parties to invoke the compulsory procedures 
in accordance with the Convention. At the same time, it would call attention to Article 
300 of the Convention, which provides that, "States Parties shall fulfil in good faith 
the obligations assumed under this Convention and shall exercise the rights, 
jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this Convention in a manner which would not 
constitute an abuse of right." While being fully aware that its claims essentially deal 
with territorial sovereignty, that China has never accepted any compulsory 
procedures in respect of those claims, and that there has been an agreement existing 
between the two States to settle their relevant disputes by negotiations, the 
Philippines has nevertheless initiated, by unilateral action, the present arbitration. 
This surely contravenes the relevant provisions of the Convention, and does no 
service to the peaceful settlement of the disputes. 
85. In view of what is stated above and in light of the manifest lack of jurisdiction on 
the part of the Arbitral Tribunal, the Chinese Government has decided not to accept 
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or participate in the present arbitration, in order to preserve China's sovereign right 
to choose the means of peaceful settlement of its own free will and the effectiveness of 
its 2006 declaration, and to maintain the integrity of Part XV of the Convention as 
well as the authority and solemnity of the international legal regime for the oceans. 
This position of China will not change. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
86. It is the view of China that the Arbitral Tribunal manifestly has no jurisdiction 
over this arbitration, unilaterally initiated by the Philippines, with regard to disputes 
between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea. 
Firstly, the essence of the subject-matter of the arbitration is the territorial 
sovereignty over the relevant maritime features in the South China Sea, which is 
beyond the scope of the Convention and is consequently not concerned with the 
interpretation or application of the Convention. 
Secondly, there is an agreement between China and the Philippines to settle their 
disputes in the South China Sea by negotiations, as embodied in bilateral instruments 
and the DOC. Thus the unilateral initiation of the present arbitration by the 
Philippines has clearly violated international law.  
Thirdly, even assuming that the subject-matter of the arbitration did concern the 
interpretation or application of the Convention, it has been excluded by the 2006 
declaration filed by China under Article 298 of the Convention, due to its being an 
integral part of the dispute of maritime delimitation between the two States.  
Fourthly, China has never accepted any compulsory procedures of the Convention 
with regard to the Philippines' claims for arbitration. The Arbitral Tribunal shall 
fully respect the right of the States Parties to the Convention to choose the means of 
dispute settlement of their own accord, and exercise its competence to decide on its 
jurisdiction within the confines of the Convention. The initiation of the present 
arbitration by the Philippines is an abuse of the compulsory dispute settlement 
procedures under the Convention. There is a solid basis in international law for 
China's rejection of and non-participation in the present arbitration. 
 
87. China consistently adheres to the policy of friendly relations with its 
neighbouring States, and strives for fair and equitable solution in respect of disputes 
of territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation by way of negotiations on the 
basis of equality and the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. China holds that 
negotiations is always the most direct, effective, and universally used means for 
peaceful settlement of international disputes. 
 
88. After years of diplomatic efforts and negotiations, China has successfully 
resolved land boundary disputes with twelve out of its fourteen neighbours, delimiting 
and demarcating some 20,000 kilometres in length of land boundary in the process, 
which accounts for over 90% of the total length of China's land boundary. On 25 
December 2000, China and Vietnam concluded, following negotiations, the 
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Agreement between the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Viet 
Nam on the Delimitation of the Territorial Seas, the Exclusive Economic Zones and 
Continental Shelves in Beibu Bay, establishing a maritime boundary between the two 
States in Beibu Bay. On 11 November 1997, the Agreement on Fisheries between the 
People's Republic of China and Japan was signed. On 3 August 2000, the Agreement 
on Fisheries between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the 
Government of the Republic of Korea was signed. On 24 December 2005, the 
Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the 
Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for Joint Development of 
Oil Resources at Sea was signed. All these are provisional arrangements pending the 
maritime delimitation between China and those States. 
 
89. The facts show that, as long as States concerned negotiate in good faith and on 
the basis of equality and mutual benefit, territorial and maritime delimitation 
disputes can be resolved properly between them. This principle and position of China 
equally apply to its disputes with the Philippines in the South China Sea. 
 
90. China does not consider submission by agreement of a dispute to arbitration as 
an unfriendly act. In respect of disputes of territorial sovereignty and maritime rights, 
unilateral resort to compulsory arbitration against another State, however, cannot be 
taken as a friendly act, when the initiating State is fully aware of the opposition of the 
other State to the action and the existing agreement between them on dispute 
settlement through negotiations. Furthermore, such action cannot be regarded as in 
conformity with the rule of law, as it runs counter to the basic rules and principles of 
international law. It will not in any way facilitate a proper settlement of the dispute 
between the two countries. Instead it will undermine mutual trust and further 
complicate the bilateral relations. 
 
91. In recent years, the Philippines has repeatedly taken new provocative actions in 
respect of Huangyan Dao and Ren'ai Jiao. Such actions have gravely hindered 
mutual political trust between China and the Philippines, and undermined the 
amicable atmosphere for China and ASEAN member States to implement the DOC 
and consult on the proposed Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. In fact, in the 
region of Southeast Asia, it is not China that has become "increasingly assertive"; it 
is the Philippines that has become increasingly provocative. 
 
92. The issue of the South China Sea involves a number of States, and is compounded 
by complex historical background and sensitive political factors. Its final resolution 
demands patience and political wisdom from all parties concerned. China always 
maintains that the parties concerned shall seek proper ways and means of settlement 
through consultations and negotiations on the basis of respect for historical facts and 
international law. Pending final settlement, all parties concerned should engage in 
dialogue and cooperation to preserve peace and stability in the South China Sea, 
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enhance mutual trust, clear up doubts, and create conditions for the eventual 
resolution of the issue. 
93. The unilateral initiation of the present arbitration by the Philippines will not 
change the history and fact of China's sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands 
and the adjacent waters; nor will it shake China's resolve and determination to 
safeguard its sovereignty and maritime rights and interests; nor will it affect the 
policy and position of China to resolve the relevant disputes by direct negotiations 
and work together with other States in the region to maintain peace and stability in 
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Judul:  Regarding the disputes between China and the Philippines.  
Dari:  黄辉 (feixiang050@gmail.com)  
Kepada:  indrasutiyarso@yahoo.com;  
Tanggal:  Jumat, 10 Februari 2017 11:57  
 
 
Dear Indra Sutiyarso, 
 
I hope this e-mail finds you well. 
 
I am Huang Hui, third secretary of the Chinese Embassy here in Jakarta. Our Embassy 
has received you letter regarding the South China Sea Arbitration. As to those 
questions you raised in your letter. I would like to share with you three documents 
published by the Chinese Government in which you can find the answer as well as 










the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Indonesia 
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Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China on China's 
Territorial Sovereignty and Maritime Rights and Interests in the South China Sea 
2016/07/12 
To reaffirm China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the 
South China Sea, enhance cooperation in the South China Sea with other countries, 
and uphold peace and stability in the South China Sea, the Government of the 
People's Republic of China hereby states as follows: 
I. China's Nanhai Zhudao (the South China Sea Islands) consist of Dongsha Qundao 
(the Dongsha Islands), Xisha Qundao (the Xisha Islands), Zhongsha Qundao (the 
Zhongsha Islands) and Nansha Qundao (the Nansha Islands). The activities of the 
Chinese people in the South China Sea date back to over 2,000 years ago. China is 
the first to have discovered, named, and explored and exploited Nanhai Zhudao and 
relevant waters, and the first to have exercised sovereignty and jurisdiction over them 
continuously, peacefully and effectively, thus establishing territorial sovereignty and 
relevant rights and interests in the South China Sea. 
Following the end of the Second World War, China recovered and resumed the 
exercise of sovereignty over Nanhai Zhudao which had been illegally occupied by 
Japan during its war of aggression against China. To strengthen the administration 
over Nanhai Zhudao, the Chinese government in 1947 reviewed and updated the 
geographical names of Nanhai Zhudao, compiled Nan Hai Zhu Dao Di Li Zhi Lüe (A 
Brief Account of the Geography of the South China Sea Islands), and drew Nan Hai 
Zhu Dao Wei Zhi Tu (Location Map of the South China Sea Islands) on which the 
dotted line is marked. This map was officially published and made known to the 
world by the Chinese government in February 1948. 
II. Since its founding on 1 October 1949, the People's Republic of China has been 
firm in upholding China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in 
the South China Sea. A series of legal instruments, such as the 1958 Declaration of 
the Government of the People's Republic of China on China's Territorial Sea, the 
1992 Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone, the 1998 Law of the People's Republic of China on the Exclusive 
Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf and the 1996 Decision of the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on 
the Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, have further 
reaffirmed China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the 
South China Sea. 
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III. Based on the practice of the Chinese people and the Chinese government in the 
long course of history and the position consistently upheld by successive Chinese 
governments, and in accordance with national law and international law, including 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, China has territorial 
sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea, including, inter 
alia: 
i. China has sovereignty over Nanhai Zhudao, consisting of Dongsha Qundao, Xisha 
Qundao, Zhongsha Qundao and Nansha Qundao; 
ii. China has internal waters, territorial sea and contiguous zone, based on Nanhai 
Zhudao; 
iii. China has exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, based on Nanhai 
Zhudao; 
iv. China has historic rights in the South China Sea. 
The above positions are consistent with relevant international law and practice. 
IV. China is always firmly opposed to the invasion and illegal occupation by certain 
states of some islands and reefs of China's Nansha Qundao, and activities infringing 
upon China's rights and interests in relevant maritime areas under China's 
jurisdiction. China stands ready to continue to resolve the relevant disputes 
peacefully through negotiation and consultation with the states directly concerned on 
the basis of respecting historical facts and in accordance with international law. 
Pending final settlement, China is also ready to make every effort with the states 
directly concerned to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature, 
including joint development in relevant maritime areas, in order to achieve win-win 
results and jointly maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea. 
V. China respects and upholds the freedom of navigation and overflight enjoyed by 
all states under international law in the South China Sea, and stays ready to work 
with other coastal states and the international community to ensure the safety of and 








Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China on 
the Award of 12 July 2016 of the Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea 
Arbitration Established at the Request of the Republic of the Philippines 
2016/07/12 
With regard to the award rendered on 12 July 2016 by the Arbitral Tribunal in the 
South China Sea arbitration established at the unilateral request of the Republic of 
the Philippines (hereinafter referred to as the "Arbitral Tribunal"), the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China solemnly declares that the award is 
null and void and has no binding force. China neither accepts nor recognizes it. 
1. On 22 January 2013, the then government of the Republic of the Philippines 
unilaterally initiated arbitration on the relevant disputes in the South China Sea 
between China and the Philippines. On 19 February 2013, the Chinese government 
solemnly declared that it neither accepts nor participates in that arbitration and has 
since repeatedly reiterated that position. On 7 December 2014, the Chinese 
government released the Position Paper of the Government of the People's Republic 
of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by 
the Republic of the Philippines, pointing out that the Philippines' initiation of 
arbitration breaches the agreement between the two states, violates the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and goes against the general 
practice of international arbitration, and that the Arbitral Tribunal has no 
jurisdiction. On 29 October 2015, the Arbitral Tribunal rendered an award on 
jurisdiction and admissibility. The Chinese government immediately stated that the 
award is null and void and has no binding force. China's positions are clear and 
consistent. 
2. The unilateral initiation of arbitration by the Philippines is out of bad faith. It aims 
not to resolve the relevant disputes between China and the Philippines, or to maintain 
peace and stability in the South China Sea, but to deny China's territorial sovereignty 
and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea. The initiation of this 
arbitration violates international law. First, the subject-matter of the arbitration 
initiated by the Philippines is in essence an issue of territorial sovereignty over some 
islands and reefs of Nansha Qundao (the Nansha Islands), and inevitably concerns 
and cannot be separated from maritime delimitation between China and the 
Philippines. Fully aware that territorial issues are not subject to UNCLOS, and that 
maritime delimitation disputes have been excluded from the UNCLOS compulsory 
dispute settlement procedures by China's 2006 declaration, the Philippines 
deliberately packaged the relevant disputes as mere issues concerning the 
interpretation or application of UNCLOS. Second, the Philippines' unilateral 
114 
 
initiation of arbitration infringes upon China's right as a state party to UNCLOS to 
choose on its own will the procedures and means for dispute settlement. As early as 
in 2006, pursuant to Article 298 of UNCLOS, China excluded from the compulsory 
dispute settlement procedures of UNCLOS disputes concerning, among others, 
maritime delimitation, historic bays or titles, military and law enforcement activities. 
Third, the Philippines' unilateral initiation of arbitration violates the bilateral 
agreement reached between China and the Philippines, and repeatedly reaffirmed 
over the years, to resolve relevant disputes in the South China Sea through 
negotiations. Fourth, the Philippines' unilateral initiation of arbitration violates the 
commitment made by China and ASEAN Member States, including the Philippines, in 
the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) to 
resolve the relevant disputes through negotiations by states directly concerned. By 
unilaterally initiating the arbitration, the Philippines violates UNCLOS and its 
provisions on the application of dispute settlement procedures, the principle of "pacta 
sunt servanda" and other rules and principles of international law. 
3. The Arbitral Tribunal disregards the fact that the essence of the subject-matter of 
the arbitration initiated by the Philippines is issues of territorial sovereignty and 
maritime delimitation, erroneously interprets the common choice of means of dispute 
settlement already made jointly by China and the Philippines, erroneously construes 
the legal effect of the relevant commitment in the DOC, deliberately circumvents the 
optional exceptions declaration made by China under Article 298 of UNCLOS, 
selectively takes relevant islands and reefs out of the macro-geographical framework 
of Nanhai Zhudao (the South China Sea Islands), subjectively and speculatively 
interprets and applies UNCLOS, and obviously errs in ascertaining facts and 
applying the law. The conduct of the Arbitral Tribunal and its awards seriously 
contravene the general practice of international arbitration, completely deviate from 
the object and purpose of UNCLOS to promote peaceful settlement of disputes, 
substantially impair the integrity and authority of UNCLOS, gravely infringe upon 
China's legitimate rights as a sovereign state and state party to UNCLOS, and are 
unjust and unlawful. 
4. China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South 
China Sea shall under no circumstances be affected by those awards. China opposes 
and will never accept any claim or action based on those awards. 
5. The Chinese government reiterates that, regarding territorial issues and maritime 
delimitation disputes, China does not accept any means of third party dispute 
settlement or any solution imposed on China. The Chinese government will continue 
to abide by international law and basic norms governing international relations as 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, including the principles of respecting 
state sovereignty and territorial integrity and peaceful settlement of disputes, and 
continue to work with states directly concerned to resolve the relevant disputes in the 
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South China Sea through negotiations and consultations on the basis of respecting 
historical facts and in accordance with international law, so as to maintain peace 










Institution of proceedings 
Subject to the provisions of Part XV, any party to a dispute may submit the dispute to 
the arbitral procedure provided for in this Annex by written notification addressed to 
the other party or parties to the dispute. The notification shall be accompanied by a 
statement of the claim and the grounds on which it is based. 
 
Article 2 
List of arbitrators 
l. A list of arbitrators shall be drawn up and maintained by the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations. Every State Party shall be entitled to nominate four arbitrators, 
each of whom shall be a person experienced in maritime affairs and enjoying the 
highest reputation for fairness, competence and integrity. The names of the persons 
so nominated shall constitute the list. 
2. If at any time the arbitrators nominated by a State Party in the list so constituted 
shall be fewer than four, that State Party shall be entitled to make further 
nominations as necessary. 
3. The name of an arbitrator shall remain on the list until withdrawn by the State 
Party which made the nomination, provided that such arbitrator shall continue to 
serve on any arbitral tribunal to which that arbitrator has been appointed until the 









Constitution of arbitral tribunal 
For the purpose of proceedings under this Annex, the arbitral tribunal shall, unless 
the parties otherwise agree, be constituted as follows: 
(a) Subject to subparagraph (g), the arbitral tribunal shall consist of 
five members. 
(b) The party instituting the proceedings shall appoint one member to 
be chosen preferably from the list referred to in article 2 of this Annex, 
who may be its national. The appointment shall be included in the 
notification referred to in article l of this Annex. 
(c) The other party to the dispute shall, within 30 days of receipt of the 
notification referred to in article l of this Annex, appoint one member 
to be chosen preferably from the list, who may be its national. If the 
appointment is not made within that period, the party instituting the 
proceedings may, within two weeks of the expiration of that period, 
request that the appointment be made in accordance with 
subparagraph (e). 
(d) The other three members shall be appointed by agreement between 
the parties. They shall be chosen preferably from the list and shall be 
nationals of third States unless the parties otherwise agree. The 
parties to the dispute shall appoint the President of the arbitral 
tribunal from among those three members. If, within 60 days of receipt 
of the notification referred to in article l of this Annex, the parties are 
unable to reach agreement on the appointment of one or more of the 
members of the tribunal to be appointed by agreement, or on the 
appointment of the President, the remaining appointment or 
appointments shall be made in accordance with subparagraph (e), at 
the request of a party to the dispute. Such request shall be made within 
two weeks of the expiration of the aforementioned 60-day period. 
(e) Unless the parties agree that any appointment under 
subparagraphs (c) and (d) be made by a person or a third State 
chosen by the parties, the President of the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea shall make the necessary appointments. If the 
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President is unable to act under this subparagraph or is a national of 
one of the parties to the dispute, the appointment shall be made by the 
next senior member of the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea who is available and is not a national of one of the parties. The 
appointments referred to in this subparagraph shall be made from the 
list referred to in article 2 of this Annex within a period of 30 days of 
the receipt of the request and in consultation with the parties. The 
members so appointed shall be of different nationalities and may not 
be in the service of, ordinarily resident in the territory of, or nationals 
of, any of the parties to the dispute. 
(f) Any vacancy shall be filled in the manner prescribed for the initial 
appointment. 
(g) Parties in the same interest shall appoint one member of the 
tribunal jointly by agreement. Where there are several parties having 
separate interests or where there is disagreement as to whether they 
are of the same interest, each of them shall appoint one member of the 
tribunal. The number of members of the tribunal appointed separately 
by the parties shall always be smaller by one than the number of 
members of the tribunal to be appointed jointly by the parties. 
(h) In disputes involving more than two parties, the provisions of 
subparagraphs (a) to (f) shall apply to the maximum extent possible. 
 
Article 4 
Functions of arbitral tribunal 
An arbitral tribunal constituted under article 3 of this Annex shall function in 














Unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree, the arbitral tribunal shall 
determine its own procedure, assuring to each party a full opportunity to be heard 
and to present its case. 
 
Article 6 
Duties of parties to a dispute 
The parties to the dispute shall facilitate the work of the arbitral tribunal and, in 
particular, in accordance with their law and using all means at their disposal, shall: 
(a) provide it with all relevant documents, facilities and information; 
and 
(b) enable it when necessary to call witnesses or experts and receive 




Unless the arbitral tribunal decides otherwise because of the particular 
circumstances of the case, the expenses of the tribunal, including the remuneration of 












Required majority for decisions 
Decisions of the arbitral tribunal shall be taken by a majority vote of its members. 
The absence or abstention of less than half of the members shall not constitute a bar 
to the tribunal reaching a decision. In the event of an equality of votes, the President 
shall have a casting vote. 
 
Article 9 
Default of appearance 
If one of the parties to the dispute does not appear before the arbitral tribunal or fails 
to defend its case, the other party may request the tribunal to continue the 
proceedings and to make its award. Absence of a party or failure of a party to defend 
its case shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings. Before making its award, the 
arbitral tribunal must satisfy itself not only that it has jurisdiction over the dispute 




The award of the arbitral tribunal shall be confined to the subject-matter of the 
dispute and state the reasons on which it is based. It shall contain the names of the 
members who have participated and the date of the award. Any member of the 












Finality of award 
The award shall be final and without appeal, unless the parties to the dispute have 
agreed in advance to an appellate procedure. It shall be complied with by the parties 
to the dispute. 
 
Article 12 
Interpretation or implementation of award 
1. Any controversy which may arise between the parties to the dispute as regards the 
interpretation or manner of implementation of the award may be submitted by either 
party for decision to the arbitral tribunal which made the award. For this purpose, 
any vacancy in the tribunal shall be filled in the manner provided for in the original 
appointments of the members of the tribunal. 
2. Any such controversy may be submitted to another court or tribunal under 
article 287 by agreement of all the parties to the dispute. 
 
Article 13 
Application to entities other than States Parties 
The provisions of this Annex shall apply mutatis mutandis to any dispute involving 
entities other than States Parties. 
 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea - Annex VII 
Annex VIII 
Source: 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/annex8.htm  
